The Myth of the Rational Voter. Por Bryan Caplan.
There’s an election tomorrow. Do voters know what they’re doing? According to the typical economist — and many political scientists — the answer is “No, but it doesn’t matter.” How could it not matter? The main argument is that the public’s errors cancel out.[1] For example, some people underestimate the benefits of immigration, and others overestimate the benefits. But as long as the average voter’s belief is true, politicians win by promoting immigration policies based on the facts.
This story is clearly comforting, but is it correct? Are the average voter’s beliefs true? In The Myth of the Rational Voter, my forthcoming book with Princeton University Press, I review a large body of evidence and conclude that the answer is definitely no. Like moths to the flame, voters gravitate to the same mistakes. They do not cancel each other out; they compound.
(…)
Economists and the public hold radically different beliefs about the economy.[4] Compared to the experts, laymen are much more skeptical of markets, especially international and labor markets, and much more pessimistic about the past, present, and future of the economy. When laymen see business conspiracies, economists see supply-and-demand. When laymen see ruinous competition from foreigners, economists see the wonder of comparative advantage. When laymen see dangerous downsizing, economists see wealth-enhancing reallocation of labor. When laymen see decline, economists see progress.[5]
While critics of the economics profession like to attribute these patterns to economists’ affluence, job security, and/or right-wing ideology, the facts are not with them. Controlling for income, income growth, job security, gender, and race only mildly reduces the size of the lay-expert belief gap. And, since the typical economist is actually a moderate Democrat, controlling for party identification and ideology makes the lay-expert belief gap get a little bigger. Economists think that markets work well not because of their extreme right-wing ideology, but despite their mild left-wing ideology.
(…)
When individual choices in markets have harmful social side effects, most people want to do something to about it. In the case of pollution, for example, economists usually want to tax emissions, and non-economists want to set emission standards. Few people just shrug their shoulders and say, “The solution to the problems of markets is more markets.”
When individual choices in democracy have harmful social side effects, however, many people really do just shrug their shoulders and say, “The solution to the problems of democracy is more democracy.” If they wish to sound more hard-headed, they may instead quote Churchill: “[D]emocracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”[11]
On reflection, though, quoting Churchill in the face of democratic failure makes about as much sense as seeing rampant air pollution, and saying, “The free market is the worst form of economic organization, except all the others.” One can criticize markets or democracy — and propose remedies — without advocating socialism or dictatorship. Democracy, like the free market, can be limited, regulated, or overruled.
Pedro Sette Câmara
André Azevedo Alves
Carlos Guimarães Pinto
Helder
Bruno Garschagen
João Luís Pinto
LA
Bruno Alves
Miguel Botelho Moniz
ruicarmo
Miguel
Elizabete Dias
antoniocostaamaral
LT
Rui Oliveira
BZ
dos ∫antos
CAT
André Abrantes Amaral
planca12
ruialbuquerque
Rodrigo Adão da Fonseca
Adolfo Mesquita Nunes
Michael Seufert
jtcb
Luciano
Se os eleitores fossem realmente racionais ficariam em casa. A probabilidade de um único voto decidir a eleição é tão baixa que sair de casa é irracional.
Comentário por JoãoMiranda — Novembro 7, 2006 @ 1:05 am
O problema é que a social-democracia transforma o voto politico numa legitimidade para invadir a sociedade civil.
Portanto, eu acho que o problema central em termos de filosofia politica para um liberal é combater a inevitabilidade da social-democracia conferida pela democracia politica.
Os caminhos são intuitivos: descentralização, privatização, direito de secessão estabelecido na constituição como forma de prevenir o centralismo democrático totalitário.
O que eu acho é que o liberalismo devia concretizar e avançar a teoria constitucional, porque obviamete a solução nao pode passar pelo “despota-principe iluminado que impoe o Estado minimo”, se bem que tal parece funcionar bem em pequenos Estados-Nação.
Comentário por CN — Novembro 7, 2006 @ 10:15 am
Muito interessante, o artigo.
Joao Miranda volta a confundir “racionalidade” com “instrumentalidade”. Racionalidade tem a ver com a *consistencia* entre “preferencias” e “escolha” e nao com as preferencias em si mesmas.
A Economia e’ sobretudo uma metodologia, nao impondo “motivacoes” aos agentes. E’ inteiramente racional um individuo votar, mesmo que a probabilidade de ser “pivotal” seja minima, se, por exemplo:
i) tiver outro tipo de beneficios (por exemplo, de “expressar” apoio ao partido com o qual se identifica ou de “sinalizar” aos membros da comunidade que e’ um cidadao “exemplar”);
ii) se nao encarar a escolha de votar ou nao votar numa perspectiva de “custo-beneficio”, mas numa perspectiva moral.
Fica (mais uma vez…) o convite para ler a Nobel Lecture de Gary Becker, para que nao se eternize uma visao comum, mas errada, do que e’ a Economia e do que e’ a racionalidade.
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1992/becker-lecture.pdf
Comentário por Tiago Mendes — Novembro 7, 2006 @ 5:10 pm